W h a t Is An A p o l o g y ?
The act of apologizing is of interest both in ethics and in the theory of speech acts. Writers in the latter field, most notably Austin^-, have often cited it as a paradigm of a performative utterance. But so far as I know, no analysis of apologizing has so far appeared in the philosophical lit erature.
It is my aim here to offer one. An instructive characterization of the applogy has recently been produced by Erving Goffman, a social psychologist, in his book, Relations In Public^; and I shall take certain of his remarks about apologizing as my point of departure.
In the first section of this paper, I shall argue that Goffman's characterization of apologizing, however true it is, and however suitable for his theoretical purposes, is too general to distinguish the apology from many other speech acts which are characteristic ally performed for the same social purpose.
In the second section, I shall try to bring the specific conceptual features of apologizing into focus by setting out my analysis of it. On Goffman's view, the apology is one of three basic rit ual devices by which we effect such a transformation. The other two are the 'account' and the 'request'.
To give an account is to represent oneself as not respon sible, or not entirely responsible, for an offense of which one is, or is liable to be, thought guilty. As Goffman points out, this can be done in a variety of ways.
Suppose, as an illustration, that Y is walking through a hall and thinks that X has bumped into h i m . Several defenses may be open to X. He may deny, for example, that any collision in fact occurred, that anyone really bumped into Y. Or he may acknowledge that someone bump&d into Y, but deny having done so himself. Or again, he may admit that it was he who bumped into Y but argue that he did so in special exculpatory, or at least mitigating, circumstances, that, for instance, he was pushed in Y's direction by a third party. Any of these defenses would be an account.
The second of Goffman's remedial rituals, the request, 'consists of asking license of a potentially offended person to engage in what could be considered a violation of his rights'.5 Thus, for example, I am making a request if I ask your leave to smoke while we are traveling in the same auto mobile or if I ask your permission to use your telephone b e fore proceeding to make a call on i t . Accounts and requests both serve to keep one's actions from being construed as offensive. Thus, for some actions they are not suitable remedies.
In particular, if one has done something which plainly i^s offensive, and can plead no miti gating circumstances, the most one may be able to do is to show by what one says and does that it does not reflect one's present attitude, that one presently takes seriously one's obligations and the rights of the offended party under the rule one has infringed. As Goffman puts it, 'after an offense has occurred, the job of the offender is to show that it was not a fair expression of his attitude, or, when it evidently was, to show that he has changed his attitude to the rule that was violated.
In the latter case, his job iŝ he ritual device we use for this task is the apology, which, according to Goffman, is 'a gesture through which an individual splits himself into two parts, the part that is guilty of an offense and the part that dissociates itself from the delict and affirms a belief in the offended rule'.7
Now the conception of an individual as capable of split ting into two social selves is of central importance in Goffman's theory of remedial interchanges; and it may prove to be a useful one in understanding the general sort of re medial ritual an apology is. However, Goffman's character ization of apologies seems to apply not just to them, but also to many other speech acts which are on many occasions performed as 'splitting gestures' of the same kind and which then serve to remedy offenses in the same general way.
Consider again X's bumping into Y in the hall and suppose that X can give no satisfactory account of the incident, that, let us say, it is obviously the result of X's culpable negligence. X may here owe it to Y to say something to him as a gesture of the general sort Goffman describes.
But this is not to say that he owes Y an apology specifically. There seem to be a considerable variety of things X can say to dis sociate his present self from his offense, among them: 
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In claiming that to apologize for something, one must, inter a l i a , express regret about it, I do not, of course, mean to imply that one must actually regret i t . As the term 'express' is used here, and as it seems often to be used col loquially, it is possible to express an attitude, sentiment, opinion, or what not without having it. This is indeed pre cisely what a person does when he expresses an attitude or feeling insincerely.
Thus, in particular, people can, and frequently do, apologize, and so express regret, with no gen uine regret about whatever they are apologizing f o r . Such apologies are insincere, but they are full-fledged apologies nonetheless. Now although every apology is an expression of regret, clearly not every expression of regret is an apology. For one thing, we do not ordinarily apologize for matters which are beyond our control, however much we may feel and express regret about them.
If, for instance, X says to Y that he is sorry that the weather is dismal, that the economy is in a slump, or that a mutual friend is in poor health, he is thereby expressing regret about these things; but he is not likely to be apologizing for them. One reason he is not, I think, is that an apology for these things, as opposed to a mere expression of regret about them, would involve accept ing responsibility for them. Thus, unless X somehow feels responsible for the state of the weather, the economy, or his friend's health, or wishes to give Y the impression that he does, he will not ordinarily apologize for these things. This consideration suggests that a second necessary condition for X's performance of an apology is this:
2) ]^n saying U to_ Y, X accepts responsibility for A.
Note that this condition does not imply that X must ex pressly accept responsibility for A.
In many, perhaps most, ordinary cases a person who apologizes for something accepts responsibility for it tacitly or implicitly in saying what ever he does to express regret about i t .
It is worth noting here how various are the sorts of things over which the variable A can range; its scope is much wider than just acts.
In addition to them, people can apol ogize for habits, events, states of affairs--any kind of 84 G-8 thing, in fact, for which they can intelligibly accept re sponsibility . Now it seems clear that if an expression of regret about something is to count as an apology, more is necessary than merely that one accept responsibility for it. We do, after all, express regret and take responsibility for many matters which are no o n e 's business but our own and for which, therefore, we should not ordinarily apologize. X is unlike ly to be apologizing to Y, for example, if he expresses re gret about having spent last summer working instead of vaca tioning or about having purchased his present car.
I think the reason X would not be apologizing to Y in expressing re gret about such things is simply that, in doing so, X would not be acknowledging that he has treated Y in any way which constitutes an offense to him. And it is partly definitive of an apology, surely, that it is a way of acknowledging that one has offended o n e 's hearer. A third condition.is thus required.
3) I_n saying U to Y, X acknowledges that by virtue of his having been responsible for A, he has treated Y in, a^ way which constitutes an offense to him.
A further condition must now be added to those on hand to take proper account of the intentionality of the concept of 'regret', in particular, of the fact that it is possible to regret something under one description while not regretting it under another .
To see the necessity of this, consider the following case. Suppose X has swindled Y by charging him twice as much money for some item as it is worth. Now if X is hard-boiled enough, he may later brazenly say to Y, 'You know, I'm awful ly sorry about that swindle. You were so gullible I could easily have got waay with charging you twice as much as I did. ' This utterance would, of course, be no apology, though it would satisfy the three conditions so far given. X is not apologizing here, I think, because he is expressing regret about the swindle, not as an offense to Y, but only as a less 85 G-9 grand feat of larceny than he might have pulled off. To rule out counter-instances of this sort, we need the follow ing as a fourth necessary condition:
4)
Tn saying U tc> Y, X expresses regret about A something, being responsible for whi c h , he has offended Y .
So far, the analysis has focused primarily on the attitude which the speaker, X, must express about his offense in order to apologize to Y. He must express regret about it, it has been argued, as an offense to Y. A final necessary condition is now required to specify a second attitude X must express, one toward Y himself, for it seems that in cer tain social contexts, a speaker can say something to his hearer in such a way as to satisfy the four conditions so far considered and yet fail to apologize precisely because in doing so he does not express an appropriate attitude to ward his hearer.
Here is such a context. Suppose that X offends Y in some way and later comes to regret it. Suppose, further that sev eral years afterward Y is employed as a journalist and is commissioned to write a biographical article about X, his erstwhile malefactor.
In the course of interviewing X about his life, Y asks him if he has any regrets. X says that he does and goes on, at tedious length, to express regret about his many misdeeds and mistakes. Now suppose that as Y is recording these various expressions of regret, X expresses regret about the very wrong he earlier did Y. Is X, in doing so, apologizing to Y?
The possibility seems undeniable that he is n o t . And this possibility cannot be accounted for in terms of the necessary conditions for apologizing so far adduced, for all of them are satisfied here. X is expressing regret about his misconduct toward Y, accepting responsibility for it, and so on. How, then, is it possible that he is nevertheless not apologizing to Y?
The answer, I think, is that X may here be saying to Y what he does only to show Y the way in which he regards his offense, and not, in addition, the way in which he regards Y himself. I suggest that in order for X to be apologizing to Y and not merely expressing regret about his offense, he must, in saying what he does, be making a gesture to Y, one whereby he presents himself as taking seriously Y's right not to be treated as he is acknowledging having treated him. In a word, in saying what he does, X must be making a ges ture of respect to Y as a person with such a right. In this situation it seems likely that however profusely X is ex pressing regret about his offense, he is not thereby making a gesture of respect to Y, and hence that he is not apolo gizing to him. To take this aspect of apologizing into a c count, a fifth necessary condition must be added to the others .
5)
Tn saying U Jto Y , X makes a_ gesture of respect for Y as a person having a right not to be treated as X is acknowledging having treated him.
The analysis now seems to be complete. To sum it up roughly, I have argued that a speaker is apologizing to his hearer for something, if and only if in saying what he does, he is 1) expressing regret about it, 2) accepting respon sibility for it, 3) acknowledging it to constitute an o f fense to his hearer, 4) expressing regret about it as such, and 5) making a gesture of respect to his hearer as a person with a right to be spared such mistreatment.
I think that this analysis in compatible with Goffman's characterization of the apology, and indeed that it comple ments it.
It may, in addition, suggest certain refinements which ought to be made in his explanation of the function of the apology in social life. But that is another m a t t e r . Louis F . Kort Department of Philosophy University of North Carolina at Greensboro Greensboro, North Carolina
